The financial crisis and global policy reforms - commentary by Kashyap, Anil K.
335
Barry Eichengreen’s paper pushed me to take a different look at the crisis and 
I encourage everyone to read the paper carefully .
I will separate these very brief remarks into three parts . First, I will review 
his basic observations, concentrating on what I see as his more novel points . 
Next I will present one picture that informs my thinking on the role of global 
imbalances in the crisis . Finally, I will extend some of his discussion on incen-
tives that I believe are important for the next steps in regulatory reform .
1. Incentives vs. Global Imbalances
The paper lays out two very different descriptions of the driving factors in the 
crisis . Depending on one’s background, parts of each account are likely to be 
familiar, but other parts will probably be new . One of the nice aspects of the 
paper is that it offers a concise but thoughtful account of each perspective . 
Another novel aspect of the paper is the very appropriate attention to the global 
policy challenges that lie ahead .
The first view, which I would dub the orthodox, financial economist’s account 
of the crisis, focuses mostly on the problems with “incentives .” Incentives here 
relate to motivating considerations of both regulators and market participants . 
The main idea is the managers and owners of financial institutions received 
rewards for investments, loans, and other actions that may not be in society’s 
interest . Unfortunately regulators did not necessarily have the tools or incen-
tives to combat some of the problems that arose .
This view leads to most of the now standard list of prescriptions for reg-
ulatory  reform .  The  standard  list  of  candidate  reforms  includes  strength-
ening capital regulation to require banks to hold more capital; changing the 
regulations that govern the resolution of an impaired institution; mandating 
commenTAry
The Financial Crisis and Global Policy Reforms
Anil K. Kashyap
author’s	note: These views are entirely my own and should not be interpreted as reflect-
ing any of the organizations with which I am affiliated.336	 ASIA ECONOMIC POLICY CONFERENCE  ASIA AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
better disclosure of information to bank regulators; reforming the structure of 
derivatives contracts to make them less disruptive in the event of bankruptcy; 
restricting the form of compensation contracts to better align employee and 
shareholder interests; and creating a new macroprudential regulator to look 
across the financial system and focus on its stability .
I agree with his concern that even some of the least controversial of these 
suggestions will be met with resistance by domestic groups who stand to be 
constrained by such changes . Coordinating globally will be even harder . The 
so-called Basel II reform took about a decade and these proposed changes are 
in many respects more fundamental and wide-reaching . I expect that many of 
these topics will remain on the table for the next few times that this conference 
convenes .
Within this set of proposals I am most intrigued by Barry’s suggestion to 
form a World Financial Organization (WFO) that would be akin to the World 
Trade Organization . The WFO would be tasked with establishing principles for 
prudential supervision, but not necessarily getting into the details of the struc-
ture of regulation . It would define obligations for its members, and countries 
would be compelled to join in order for their domestic financial institutions to 
have free access to foreign markets . The WFO would monitor members’ compli-
ance with the rules and impose sanctions for noncompliance .
I like several aspects of this suggestion . First, it is bold . Why should the 
next iteration on reform proceed by moving around the boxes on the existing 
organizational charts? Second, it would greatly accelerate global harmonization 
of the rules, which otherwise will be the last step in the overhaul of the regu-
latory system . Until the loopholes are closed globally, the likelihood of success 
of reform is doubtful . Finally, it provides a unified approach to tackling many 
of the thorniest problems . Absent the creation of something like the WFO, the 
reforms are likely to be the product of a series of one-off negotiations because 
so many different changes will be required . This is an idea that deserves seri-
ous consideration .
The second perspective, which I will call the global imbalances view, pre-
sumes that the flow of savings from emerging economies and oil exporters into 
developed economies could not be effectively absorbed . The flows depressed 
interest rates, and monetary and fiscal policies were not effective in preventing 
large current account deficits in the U .S . and several other countries .
I agree with Barry that global imbalances have not been good for the world 
economy during this decade . But as he writes, “slightly more convoluted is the 
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the crisis .” I would go farther and say that without the incentive problems high-
lighted in the first view it is hard to see how the global imbalances alone could 
have been so disruptive . I present more on the basis for this claim later .
Nonetheless, the events starting in 2007 still have a number of lessons for 
policy  makers . Perhaps most important is that inflation targeting as practiced 
needs to be changed . As advocates of inflation targeting point out, today, in light 
of the unprecedented monetary accommodation that is in place, it is valuable to 
have an inflation objective to help anchor expectations . So we should not aban-
don it . But inflation targeting let us down a bit during the middle of this decade . 
The imbalances that were building were perhaps too easily dismissed as harm-
less because inflation was on target . It appears that a new consensus is emerg-
ing that suggests we will need to pay more attention to the financial system per 
se . In regulating it, other tools in addition to the short-term interest rate should 
be the first line of defense .
Barry points out that we also saw that either large current account sur-
pluses or deficits have proved difficult to manage . Likewise, that procyclical 
fiscal policy and reserve accumulation have contributed to problems that we 
are now facing . Finally, he notes that the failure to let relative prices move in 
response to shifts in demand is undesirable .
2. current Account deficits and Banking Problems
I agree with all of these conclusions . But I believe that even if all of this advice 
had been followed, the incentive issues in the financial system were still likely 
to have caused problems . One basis for this claim are the data presented in Fig-
ure 1 . These data are from Gete (2009) and show the association between the 
change in the current account and the share of labor in the construction for 
major economies between 1994 and 2006 . One can see that current account defi-
cits and housing booms occurred together during this period— this is the point 
of Gete’s paper and he shows that this pattern is evident using many different 
measures .
The banking problems, however, were not closely correlated with the cur-
rent account imbalances . Banks in Switzerland and Germany, which saw their 
current accounts swing strongly toward surpluses, managed to get into plenty 
of trouble during the crisis . But so did banks in the U .S . where the patterns 
were reversed . Thus, the simplest story that a flood of savings poured into some 
countries and the banks in those countries could not absorb them does not look 
correct . A better story seems to be that the banks in most developed countries 
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magnitude of the problems would have been reduced if the global economy had 
been better balanced, but I think the chances of avoiding a crisis were low .
3. more on Incentives
Given the primary emphasis I put on the role of incentives in exacerbating the 
crisis, I want to close by elaborating on some of the points Barry only briefly 
mentions and raise a couple of related observations .
In  passing,  in  footnote  10,  Barry  mentions  the  problem  of  having  the 
right  compensation  structure  for  regulators .  This  I  fear  is  a  much  more 
serious challenge than he makes it out to be . Let me offer some numbers 
to  put  the  problem  in  perspective .  Bertand,  Goldin,  and  Katz  (2009)  note 

































































FiGuRE  1 
current Accounts and labor devoted to construction, 1994–2006
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that the median salary and bonus for an MBA graduate from the Univer-
sity of Chicago who graduated between 1990 and 2006 and started out work- 
ing as an investment banker and has nine years of experience is $470,000 per 
year (regardless of whether he stays in investment banking) . Perhaps more rel-
evant, my informal sample of salaries last year for new PhDs in finance who 
received job offers at mid-tier business schools was a nine-month salary of 
roughly $160,000 . Typically these offers include an additional 22 percent sti-
pend of summer support for the first few years of the contract .
This is the market in which the systemic risk regulator (SRR) will have 
to compete for talent . Assuming the SRR wants to hire roughly 50 PhDs, it is 
highly doubtful that this can happen given the existing pay norms at the U .S . 
Treasury or Federal Reserve . As already discussed, many of the looming reg-
ulatory challenges will require foundational research . If the staff of the SRR is 
not on the research frontier, the odds of success are low . Therefore, if the SRR is 
going to be effective, the compensation question will have to be addressed . The 
model developed to staff the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board sug-
gests that this problem is not insurmountable, but it will require breaking away 
from the current government norms .
A second question is what tools will we give to the SRR? One of the disturb-
ing aspects of the crisis is that there were some warnings offered that were 
ignored . The most persistent warnings came from the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) . We (policymakers, politicians, and academics) should all ask 
why these concerns were ignored .
My conclusion is that part of the problem was that the BIS had no instru-
ments with which to affect policy . This suggests that the SRR cannot be rel-
egated to a pure monitoring role if it is to avoid the same fate . Thus, I favor 
starting the discussion soon about which policy levers we will give the SRR . 
There are many options for doing this (see Squam Lake Working Group 2009 
and Kashyap and Stein 2009 for some options, so this is more a matter of choos-
ing from existing ideas than developing new ideas .
Summing up, Barry’s paper offers an excellent tour of the issues ahead . It 
would be great if we were to embrace many of the suggestions that he offers . But 
more important than the particular choices that are made is that we act now to 
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